One of Ours

...there's some wisdom -- and certainly a strategy behind John Kerry's relative absence from the airwaves over the last six to eight weeks.

The conventional rule of campaigning is that you don't let your opponent define you before you get a chance to define yourself.

Yet, as Ryan describes it, the Kerry plan is to do something very near the opposite. The plan is to take these punches from the Bush campaign and let Bush burn through a lot of his money. Hopefully, in the view of the Kerry campaign, Kerry comes through that without having suffered too much damage. Then Kerry fights back with hard-hitting ads through the late spring and summer with Bush having squandered his huge money advantage...

...This is one of those strategies that is improbably brilliant unless it turns out to be completely stupid...

On March 1, Kerry had $2.4 million in the bank and Bush had $110 million. By the end of April, a rough educated guess, based on how both candidates are raising and spending money, would put Kerry's cash on hand at about $60 million and Bush's at about $75 million.

So there's certainly a way of looking at what's happened over the last month or so and say that Bush has essentially squandered his entire financial advantage over Kerry. And the race is still neck and neck...

...Of course, if the strategy is bad, commitment to it simply ensures a bad result. And that, I suppose, would make Kerry rather like Bush, who intends to continue demonstrating leadership by adhering to an already demonstrably failed strategy until he runs the whole nation right off the cliff...

AUSTRALIA did not begin serious talks with the United States about military action in Iraq until mid-2002, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said today.

He said the Bush administration had been less concerned about military intervention in Iraq than the previous Clinton administration.

In 1998, then US secretary of state Madeleine Albright wanted to take military action to overthrow Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, Mr Downer said.

"That was her view in 1998," he told Channel 10.

But Mr Downer said the focus shifted once George W. Bush took over as US president.

"In 2001, I don't recall there being too much focus in our conversations with the Americans about Iraq," he said...

...Civil war and the breakup of Iraq are more likely outcomes than a successful transition to a pluralistic Western-style democracy...

...The best hope for holding Iraq together—and thereby avoiding civil war—is to let each of its major constituent communities have, to the extent possible, the system each wants...

...this means accepting that Kurdistan will continue to govern its own affairs and retain responsibility for its own security...

...If Kurdistan feels secure, it is in fact more likely to see advantages to cooperation with other parts of Iraq. Iraq's vast resources and the benefits that would accrue to Kurdistan from revenue sharing provide significant incentives for Kurdistan to remain part of Iraq, provided doing so does not open the way to new repression...

...In the south, Iraq's Shiites want an Islamic state. They are sufficiently confident of public support that they are pushing for early elections...

...Federalism—or even confederation —would make Kurdistan and the south governable because there are responsible parties there who can take over government functions...

...a three-state solution for Iraq, modeled on the constitution of post-Tito Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav model would give each of Iraq's constituent peoples their own republic. These republics would be self-governing, financially self-sustaining, and with their own territorial military and police forces. The central government would have a weak presidency rotating among the republics, with responsibilities limited to foreign affairs, monetary policy, and some coordination of defense policy. While resources would be owned by the republics, some sharing of oil revenues would be essential, since an impoverished Sunni region is in no one's interest...

...If the United States wanted to stay militarily in Iraq, Kurdistan is the place; Kurdish leaders have said they would like to see permanent US bases in Kurdistan...

...As for the Sunni Triangle...the United States may face the choice of turning power over to weak leaders and living with the resulting chaos...the three-state approach could limit US military engagement to a finite area...

...Because of what happened to Yugoslavia in the 1990s, many react with horror to the idea of applying its model to Iraq. Yet Yugoslavia's breakup was not inevitable. In the 1980s, Slovenia asked for greater control over its own affairs and Milosevic refused. Had Milosevic accepted a looser federation, there is every reason to think that Yugoslavia—and not just Slovenia— would be joining the European Union this May...

It seems very hard for some people--especially those in high places, but also those striving for high places--to grasp a simple truth: The United States does not belong in Iraq. It is not our country. Our presence is causing death, suffering, destruction, and so large sections of the population are rising against us. Our military is then reacting with indiscriminate force, bombing and shooting and rounding up people simply on "suspicion."...

...any discussion of "What do we do now?" must start with the understanding that the present U.S. military occupation is morally unacceptable...

SO, what do we do in Iraq? It is obvious that the Bush administration and its distant and sometimes independent offshoot, the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, have been knocked off balance by events...the administration certainly doesn't convey the impression that it has any plan left--except to (convincingly) promise perseverance and cross its fingers and hope that the U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi can devise a new political roadmap for the transfer of sovereignty on June 30.

At this point, it is worthwhile to remember that the vast majority of Iraqis are still probably on "our side," that is, they sincerely want a peaceful and workable transition of sovereignty that leads to a functioning, democratic Iraq...The Sunni "insurrection," for example, was in all probability inevitable. Would that we'd rounded up sooner more men from Saddam's elite military units, the intelligence and security services, and the paramilitary storm troopers, but these folks were going to come for us in any case. Ditto the Sunni militants and foreign holy warriors who have no intention to allow a Shiite-led democracy to take shape. And if the CPA had adopted the anti-Shiite mentality present in the voluminous, much-touted, but seldom-read State Department guide to Iraqi reconstruction, things in Iraq could be far worse. Sometimes poor--or no--planning is better than stacks of consistently bad ideas.

But what do we do now?...


The Sunnis. What is the CPA trying to accomplish in the siege of Falluja?...Even Iraqis who hate the insurrectionists may start to flip on us because the Americans appear to be engaging in an endless military action. Iraqi nationalism is a real and fickle thing. Even Shiites who would be thrilled to see the American military maul the ex-Baathists and Sunni fundamentalists fortified in the town (better the Americans deal with them now than we have to later) could start to turn if the United States undertakes a protracted siege...Bin Ladenism is primarily fed by the appearance of American indecision and weakness...

The United States simply cannot afford to engage in siege tactics. Negotiations must lead to the immediate surrender of the town and all those within it--the surrender of the insurgents' weaponry is meaningless since weaponry in Iraq can be quickly reacquired. Any agreement where the insurgents abandon their heavy weaponry and withdraw from the town unmolested is even worse. This will only punt down the road a worse confrontation...the only real option is for the Marines to storm the place. We should have taken the town immediately after the four American contract-workers were desecrated; indeed, U.S. armed forces should have cleaned up Falluja months ago. If there is one town in Iraq that has merited classic counterinsurgency tactics, it is Falluja. No doubt, there could be unpleasant repercussions within Iraq and elsewhere from a direct assault...we now have no choice...

The Sunnis and politics. It is obvious and understandable that the CPA is desperately trying to engage the Arab Sunnis in a political process that will, in theory, diminish the violence within the Sunni Triangle...Brahimi...has already let it be known that he believes the Americans have engaged in too much de-Baathification...

...let us repeat what has become obvious since the "insurrection" of Moktada al-Sadr started: We lose the Shiites, we lose Iraq...

...The Sunni will to power is the common denominator of modern Iraqi history...Travel Iraq and it is easy to find Sunnis who sincerely want to see their country democratic. Spend much time among the former military elite and you don't come away with the same sensation. Rather, you get the impression that they are furious at Saddam Hussein for going too far, for cocking up what had been a very good and sustainable situation.

...how many Sunnis will we need to hire into the new army to make the Sunnis feel as if they've received their "fair" share? Do we really think that whatever that share is will turn most of the Sunni rejectionists into democrats? If there is one thing the Provisional Authority may do in Iraq that most resembles Russian roulette, this is it. It would be very wise for the administration...to clear senior Sunni Arab military appointments with a good sampling of Shiites--especially the senior clergy in Najaf.

The essential political step for the Sunnis, as for all Iraqis, is to move to national elections as quickly as possible...


For the Shiites

(1) At all times treat Grand Ayatollah Sistani as the leader of the Shiite community...

(2) Realize we have more maneuvering room with the rebellion of Sadr than with the Sunnis in Falluja. This means, first and foremost, don't attack the holy city of Najaf...There is nothing wrong, however, with going after Sadr's men elsewhere in the country if they engage in any violent actions against Iraqis, Americans, or our allies...Ultimately, however, Sistani and the Hawza must handle Sadr...

(3) ...We should state loudly and clearly that we do not want United Nations participation in the political reconstruction of Iraq to delay elections for a constitutional assembly or a national assembly by a single day.

(4) We should state loudly and often that we will oppose any U.N. plan that diminishes the democratic throw-weight of the Shiite majority in Iraq...

(5) If Brahimi and Sistani disagree on any issue pertaining to the representation of Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds in a transitional government, side with Sistani...

(6) The Transitional Administrative Law is probably as dead as a door-nail. Don't waste time defending it. We should encourage the Shiites and Kurds to sit down and work out a different arrangement to protect Kurdish rights other than through a constitutional veto that effectively checks a Shiite majority on virtually any legislative matter. Encourage the Kurds and Shiites to work out, perhaps through a bicameral legislature, a checks-and-balances arrangement that makes it very difficult for a majority to run roughshod over Kurdish concerns.

(7) ...the battle between a one-man, one-vote democracy and Iran's theocratic "rule of the jurisconsult" (velayat-e faqih)--is enormous...we shouldn't complicate their lives or ours by seeking, openly or clandestinely, any bilateral U.S.-Iranian discussion on Iraq that allows Iran an official role in Iraq's reconstruction. If Brahimi starts to move in this direction, stop him.


The Kurds. ...We should tell the Kurds that we will not support them against the Shiite objection to their comprehensive constitutional veto power in the Transitional Administrative Law...


The United Nations and the Europeans....We should obviously support Brahimi's efforts, but we should do so only as long as he does not run afoul of the majority of Shiites. If he does that, we need to be prepared to seize the initiative back, call for national, constituent elections within six months, and directly ask Sistani--privately at first, publicly if necessary--to whom we should transfer sovereignty on June 30. We should not hesitate to pass the responsibility for this to the Grand Ayatollah. (And we will see if he takes it.)

And concerning the Europeans, don't expect more of them to embrace our democratic cause in Iraq, even with a U.N. resolution...France and Germany have more to gain in Europe--and therefore, in their eyes, in the world--if America is laid low in Iraq...

Zayphar,

1- The people whom the Marines have been talking to may not be representative of the entire Dulaim conglomeration. A veritable conference with all the representatives should be aimed at.
2- Of course the radicals and especially the foreigners don’t much care about the property and lives of the normal people. An Afghan or a Palestinian doesn’t really care, and in fact they want to inflict harm on the ordinary people. The longer the attrition continues the more irritation will grow against these elements, and the contradiction is bound to reach a point when the majority will swing decisively against them. Some patience is required and sooner or later you will have people wanting your help.
3- Those whose authority is undercut as you say, will wish secretly that they be rid of these elements, however they will never admit it publicly. You will even hear them protesting and lamenting loudly, when deep down they have quite different sentiments. This is customary in these parts.
4- Finally my friendly advice is this: 90% Brains; 10% Muscles - that should be the motto.

Salaam

...trying to “make history” without “knowing history” is like trying to write a new chapter of a book without having read and understood the previous chapters...

...As far as the present campaign is concerned, in many respects it is a re-enactment of events that took place about 90 years ago but with modern setting and actors. You might be interested to know that some of the arguments and discussions going on at the moment are almost identical to those of one century ago...

...The British also faced revolts and “Ayatollah’s”, and had to think very hard of the form of Government to install, and how to bring stability and tranquility after the famous 1920 Insurrection. It came to pass that a Kingdom was proclaimed in the early 20’s of the last century, and limited sovereignty under British Mandate continued until 1932, some 15 years after the fall of Baghdad...

...the British Empire had clear objectives defined by Self Interests and protecting the “routes to India”, not to mention Oil, which they knew then of its existence there. The American Project is much more grandiose and ambitious (and hence more difficult to define precisely) as advocated by the goals set out by President Bush, and the school of thought around him; which by the way, are highly admirable from the moral point of view. But to be fair to the Americans, there was not in those days the level of frustration and hatred that exist today, nor were terrorist tactics known or practiced.

...An example of what can be practically learnt from previous experience, is the present situation in Fallujah. It might be useful if proper detailed knowledge of the tribal make up and personalities of the Dulaim region is made available to U.S. strategists engaged in the struggle. For instance, in the ongoing negotiations, contacts with, and presence of genuine tribal leaders and influential personalities might be insisted upon, whose cooperation and appeasement might bring real pressures to bear on the rebellious elements. Personally, I think a political solution would be superior and have more lasting effects; since merely storming the town and killing a number of rebels might not bring the decisive results hoped for, whereas intensifying the political and negotiating process under real palpable threat of action, and trying to draw the entire Dulaim tribal structure into this dialogue, might be much more productive in the short and long terms. I certainly hope that this is taken into consideration before precipitate action is initiated thereby losing the pressurizing value of the overhanging threat, not to mention other troubles that might ensue.