One of Ours

Mr. Clarke says that American "HUMINT capabilities were eviscerated during the 1980s and 1990s", and draws a connection between this capabilities gap and our failure to interdict Al Qaeda while it was growing in the 1990s.

At one point, Ms. Gorelick asks why Mr. Clarke didn't go further with his recommendations, and why his recommendations weren't followed, especially after the thwarted attacks on L.A. airport at the time of the Millenium. The response -- (1) that policymaking is often the art of the possible, and (2) that it wasn't possible to get these policies adopted before the horror of 9/11 and the reality of 3,000 American deaths. To paraphrase, Mr. Clarke says that it takes body bags to make policy changes.

GORTON: ...Assuming that the recommendations that you made on January 25th of 2001, based on Delenda, based on Blue Sky, including aid to the Northern Alliance, which had been an agenda item at this point for two and a half years without any action, assuming that there had been more Predator reconnaissance missions, assuming that that had all been adopted say on January 26th, year 2001, is there the remotest chance that it would have prevented 9/11?
CLARKE: No..

GORTON: Yes, but there was no recommendation, on your part or anyone else's part, that we declare war and attempt to invade Afghanistan prior to 9/11?
CLARKE: That's right.

CLARKE: "By invading Iraq, the President has greatly undermined the war on terrorism."

Mr. Clarke testified that he was very supportive of retaliatory and preemptive strikes against Al Qaeda during the Clinton and Bush Administrations -- "not waiting for the terrorist attack ... but taking the offensive against terrorist organizations that looked like they threatened the United States". So my guess is that Mr. Clarke was initially happy with the President's National Security Strategy which incorporates pre-emptive (preventive?) military action, but that he later became disillusioned with the White House strategy when the target became Iraq.